I. introduction
Economic development has become a major concern of many local Under c e r t a i n r e g u l a r i t y conditions, t h e demand f o r p r i v a t e c a p i t a l and labor can be described as a f u n c t i o n of p u b l i c c a p i t a l : Again, a congestion function could be specified as described for the production function. Since the income o f the median voter is a function of the wage rate and the demand for labor by firms in the community, the demand for publlc infrastructure is also a function o f the level of private capital investment. 
W i t h i n t h i s simple framework, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e c a p i t a l may be i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n : p u b l i c c a p i t a l may a c t i v

S i m s Test The Sims t e s t i s b a s i c a l l y a t e s t o f p r e d i c t i v e n e s s . A t best, i t can t e s t Granger's s t a t i s t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n o f c a u s a l i t y . A t t h e l e a s t , i t can t e s t whether an optimal p r e d i c t i o n o f one s e r i e s depends upon another. The a b i l i t y t o t e s t a s p e c i f i c hypothesis depends upon a p r i o r i r e s t r i c t i o n s placed on the s t r u c t u r a l equations. This problem w i t h " c a u s a l i t y " t e s t i n g was f i r s t reported by Jacobs, Learner, and Ward (1979). To i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r p o i n t , they consider a simple s t r u c t u r a l model t h a t serves our purpose of model i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r i v a t e and p u b l i c investment. Consider the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t p u b l i c o u t l a y s (g) e x p l a i n p r i v a t e investment ( k ) : and the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t p r i v a t e investment ( k > explains p u b l i c investment (9):
where (t-1) i s a generalized delay o f i periods and c l t and c t t are independent, s e r i a l l y uncorrelated random variables w i t h zero means and variances a: a:, respectively.
The reduced form o f t h i s s t r u c t u r a l system i s
Since we are concerned about feedback from p r i v a t e t o public investment, we focus on three hypotheses t h a t describe the extent k influences g: H1: t=Ozz=O. JLW refer t o t h i s hypothesis as "k does not cause g," o r t h a t a p o l i c y t h a t c o n t r o l l e d k by selecting the e r r o r c l t could not have any impact on the g variable.
Hz:
T=O. JLW refer t o t h i s as "g i s contemporaneously exogenous."
:
tB1l+Ozl=O=nzl. This i s the hypothesis t h a t an optimal p r e d i c t i o n o f g does not depend on k. JLW r e f e r t o t h i s as "k i s not informative about f u t u r e g."
As they note, H, i s o f t e n mistaken for the causality hypothesis (HI).
Since the s t r u c t u r a l model i s not i d e n t i f i e d and none o f the parameters can be estimated, i t I s not possible t o estimate T and 0 and thus not possible t o t e s t HI.
What can be estimated i s nzl. I f i t i s discovered that n z l is zero, then k is not informative about future. An analogous regression of k on past and f u t u r e g i s then estimated t o t e s t i f k i s informative about g. Since the e r r o r term (w) w i l l generally be s e r i a l l y correlated, use o f OLS w i l l y i e l d consistent but i n e f f i c i e n t parameter estimates. A generalized l e a s t squares approach o r some other method o f p r e f i l t e r i n g the time series i s used. Sims suggests a s p e c i f i c f i l t e r (1-.75LI2 where i t i s applied t o the natural logs of the time series. Sims reports t h a t t h i s i s successful i n f l a t t e n i n g the spectral density o f most economic time series. Sims does report, however, t h a t h i s f i l t e r does not completely prewhiten the series. Feige
and Pearce (1979) show t h a t the choice o f p r e f i l t e r i n g does a f f e c t the F -s t a t i s t i c s . We, therefore, estimate equation (10) 
One obvious d i f f i c u l t y w i t h r e l a t i n g the two time series i s t h a t p u b l i c o u t l a y s are a v a i l a b l e o n l y for c e n t r a l c i t i e s over the e n t i r e time period, w h i l e p r i v a t e investment i s f o r the e n t i r e SMSA. The s e v e r i t y of t h i s problem v a r i e s across c i t i e s and time periods. For instance, p r i o r t o World War 11, c e n t r a l c i t i e s comprised most o f t h e SMSA and d e f i n i t e l y dominated f i s c a l expenditures. Even a f t e r World War 11, c e n t r a l c i t i e s provided much o f the major water treatment f a c i l i t i e s and contained much of the highway complexes. I n r e c e n t years i n which SMSA-level expenditures are a v a i l a b l e , we f i n d t h a t the percentage of t o t a l o u t l a y s i n an SMSA by c e n t r a l c i t i e s v a r i e s from an average of 30 percent t o o v e r 90 percent. The c i t y o f Cleveland, for example, accounted f o r approximately 28 percent o f t o t a l SMSA expenditures on p u b l i c c a p i t a l d u r i n g 1965-81, although i t c o n t r i b u t e d close t o 90 percent of water treatment expenditures. New York C i t y , on t h e o t h e r hand, c o n t r i b u t e d n e a r l y 80 percent o f the t o t a l SMSA expenditures on p u b l i c i n f r a s t r u c t u r e d u r i n g t h e same time p e r i o d . Thus, one would expect services provided by c e n t r a l c i t i e s t o s p i l l over i n t o t h e r e s t of the SMSA. here fore, t h e p u b l i c investment s e r i e s i s u s e f u l i n e x p l o r i n g l e a d and l a g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between l o c a l p u b l i c and p r i v a t e investment.
IV. Results
Recogni zi ng that private and pub1 ic expenditures over three-quarters
SMSAs. One reason f o r t h i s d i f f e r e n c e may be t h a t the f o u r f u t u r e and
past lags may n o t be long enough t o p i c k up the e f f e c t of p u b l i c on p r i v a t e f o r some c i t i e s . When the e n t i r e p e r i o d was used, c o e f f i c i e n t s o f the e l e v e n t h and t w e l f t h leads were s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t in-some cases. Thus, n i n e SMSAs t h a t r e j e c t e d the nu1 1 hypothesis t h a t pub1 i c does n o t i n f l u e n c e p r i v a t e investment when t h e 12-year l a g was used i n the longer p e r i o d could n o t r e j e c t i t when s h o r t e r lags were necessary. 
This problem was o f f s e t t o some extent by t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l for d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s before and a f t e r t h e war. For example, seven SMSAs t h a t d i d n o t r e j e c t t h e
Siqn and Magnitude o f the C o r r e l a t i o n between Investment Series The
Sirns t e s t reveals s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s between p r i v a t e and p u b l i c investment f o r a number o f SMSAs i n the sample, b u t i t 1 s unable t o reveal the magnitude and sign o f the c o r r e l a t i o n between pub1 l c and p r i v a t e investment. W e estimate t h i s e f f e c t for the pre-war and postwar periods f o r a subsample o f SMSAs using a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t approach. then the sum can be i n t e r p r e t e d as the long-run e f f e c t .
Because of t h e s t r o n g p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t o t h e r factors a f f e c t investment decisions i n b o t h the p r i v a t e and
The f i r s t r e s u l t t o n o t i c e i n t a b l e 3 i s t h a t a l l s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t s a r e p o s i t i v e . Thus, an increase i n one type o f investment b r i n g s about an increase i n investment o f t h e o t h e r type.
Second, w i t h o n l y a few exceptions, the r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t were found t o be s i g n i f i c a n t using the Sims t e s t , were a l s o s t a t l s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n these regressions.
Results show t h a t the long-run e f f e c t o f p r i v a t e investment on p u b l i c investment i s always l e s s than one. Furthermore, the e f f e c t appears t o be much l a r g e r i n the prewar p e r i o d than i n t h e postwar period. The r e l a t i v e magnitudes between t h e two periods are reversed f o r the long-run Note: Dependent v a r i a b l e equals one (zero) i f F -s t a t i s t i c d e r i v e d from t h e Sims t e s t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t ( i n s i g n i f i c a n t ) a t the 5 p e r c e n t l e v e l . T -s t a t i s t i c s are i n parentheses. The v a r i a b l e WEST denotes SMSAs i n t h e western U.S.; SOUTH denotes SMSAs i n the southern U.S.; w i t h t h e n o r t h e a s t and the midwest included i n t h e i n t e r c e p t . The v a r i a b l e EARLY i s t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e year i n which maximum p o p u l a t i o n (MAXPOPY) was reached and t h e year i n which maximum pub1 i c c a p i t a l stock was obtained. MAXPOP i s t h e maximum p o p u l a t i o n o f the c e n t r a l c i t y i n t h e SMSA. CAPN i s the maximum p u b l i c c a p i t a l stock of t h e c e n t r a l c i t y i n the SMSA.
Source: A u t h o r ' s c a l c u l a t i o n s . Note: Model A (B) regresses t h e i n n o v a t i o n s o f c u r r e n t p u b l i c ( p r i v a t e ) investment on i n n o v a t i o n s o f p r i v a t e ( p u b l i c ) investment w i t h l a g s 0-6. The e s t i m a t e r e p o r t e d i n t h e t a b l e i s t h e sum of t h e c o e f f i c i e n t s o f l a g s 1-6. For each t i m e s e r i e s , i n n o v a t i o n s a r e t h e r e s i d u a l s from a r e g r e s s i o n of t h e s e r i e s on a d l s t r l b u t e d l a g of p a s t values o u t four years.
Source: A u t h o r ' s c a l c u l a t i o n s . 
